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Like jurisprudence generally, constitutional theory is currently suf-
fering through something of an identity crisis. The rhetoric of neutral
principles no longer dominates scholarly discourse; in its place one finds
a diverse variety of approaches to constitutional analysis, each claiming
to provide unique insights into the process. Prominent among these ap-
proaches are explicitly normative theories which argue that one should
evaluate the work of the Supreme Court in terms of its effect either on
some specific substantive value such as economic efficiency or on a more
general scheme of political or economic values such as democracy or
socialism.
Feminist jurisprudence is one of the most vibrant of the explicitly
normative theories. Downplaying institutional concerns, this approach
focuses on the effect that constitutional adjudication has on the ongoing
efforts to redefine sex roles in America. Typically, adherents to the femi-
nist approach argue for greater judicial activism to advance the cause of
sexual equality.
Professor Ann Freedman's recent Yale Law Journal article, "Sex
Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court"' is a paradigmatic
example of the feminist approach to constitutional jurisprudence. Ambi-
tiously surveying a wide range of sex discrimination cases, Professor
Freedman explores the impact that the various analytic frameworks
adopted by the Court have not only on the law itself, but also on more
general societal attitudes toward sex role differentiation. Her article
yields important insights into these issues; it also, however, reveals the
limitations of feminist jurisprudence as a tool for understanding the pro-
cess of constitutional adjudication.
Using Professor Freedman's article as a model, this comment will
explore those limitations. The comment will briefly outline her ap-
proach, analysis, and conclusions, and then discuss their limitations.
* Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE LJ. 913 (1983).
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden, N.J.
1. 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983).
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I. PROFESSOR FREEDMAN'S APPROACH-AN OVERVIEW
Professor Freedman's analysis begins with a description of the
Supreme Court's performance in sex discrimination cases. She views the
Court as split into "warring factions' 2 and as having "oscillated between
two different approaches to legislative sex classifications, reflecting op-
posing views about the nature and significance of such classifications. ' 3
According to Freedman, one faction is composed of Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Rehnquist, and now-retired Justice Stewart, the other of Justices
Brennan and Marshall, "usually supported by Justice White and recently
joined by Justice O'Connor."'4 Each faction is described as pursuing a
generally unified approach. The balance of power is seen as resting with
a group of "swing" justices-Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens-whose
own perspectives do not consistently align them with one faction or the
other.5
Although Professor Freedman is dissatisfied with the approaches of
both major factions, she is unsparing in her criticisms of Justices Rehn-
quist and Stewart. Viewing their approach as one based on the theory
that sex discrimination is lawful if related to a "real" difference between
the sexes, she argues that Justices Rehnquist and Stewart have an unduly
broad conception of the "reality" of the differences between the sexes.6
This conception she contends, is derived on large part from "unreflective
biological determinism."'7 Thus, Professor Freedman concludes that the
Rehnquist-Stewart approach "obscures our collective responsibility for
making the choices that will determine whether pervasive inequalities be-
tween the sexes will remain or be eliminated."'8
By contrast, Professor Freedman views the Brennan-Marshall ap-
proach with some ambivalence. Perceiving this approach as based on a
moral critique of sexism, Professor Freedman lauds Justices Brennan and
Marshall for "contribut[ing] in important ways to the ongoing debate
about the meaning and desirability of equality between the sexes . . .
[by] demonstrat[ing] the feasibility of sex-neutral alternatives to the ster-
eotyped thinking about the sexes that underlies the challenged rules." 9
But while generally satisfied with their ultimate conclusions, she is less
enamored of the primary thrust of the Brennan-Marshall opinions.
2. Id. at 922.
3. Id. at 924.
4. Id. at 925, 927.
5. Id. at 929-30.
6. Id. at 944-45.
7. Id. at 952.
8. Id. at 949.
9. Id. at 952.
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These opinions, she notes, typically argue that the challenged discrimina-
tion is invalid because it lacks a sufficiently close relationship to the gov-
ernment's objective. Professor Freedman contends that this mode of
argument conveys the message that "only irrational sex classifications are
harmful or necessary to change" and therefore does not adequately deal
with "hard" cases-"situations in which the pursuit of sex equality is
difficult or costly and in which the use of sex classifications is therefore
arguably rational."10
To address these "difficult" situations, Professor Freedman proposes
that the Court adopt an "explicitly normative theory of sex equality that
identifies with some particularity the dynamics and harmful conse-
quences of sexism."1" She first argues that such an approach would be
consistent with American constitutional history.12 The article then de-
scribes the parameters of her proposed theory, and concludes by assert-
ing that an "increased emphasis in judicial decisions on explicit debate
about the values at stake in sex discrimination cases would contribute
significantly to the struggle for equality between the sexes." 13
Professor Freedman thus deals with the Supreme Court's sex dis-
crimination jurisprudence on a number of different levels. She is quite
successful in her attempts to place the developing case law in the overall
context of the more general debate on the meaning of sex roles in society.
However, to the extent that her article purports to describe the process
by which the Court reaches its decisions in sex discrimination cases, it
leaves a somewhat incomplete and misleading impression.
II. THE VOTING PATrERN OF THE JUSTICES
One of the most striking features of her analysis is its treatment of
the three justices who might be collectively referred to as the "conserva-
tives." While conceding that the positions of the conservatives differ
somewhat with respect to sex discrimination cases, 14 Professor Freedman
views these differences as relatively unimportant. She regards the ap-
proaches of Chief Justice Burger, and of Justices Rehnquist and Stewart
as sufficiently similar to characterize them as a cohesive group with an
essentially unitary form of analysis-an analysis that can be effectively
contrasted with both that of Justices Brennan and Marshall and those of
the various "swing" justices. As a result, her article substantially under-
10. Id at 952, 960-61.
11. Id. at 961.
12. Id. at 961-64.
13. Id. at 968.
14. See id at 927-28.
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states the depth and significance of the differences among the three
conservatives.
This point is illustrated by the voting patterns in cases involving
constitutional challenges to facially discriminatory statutes. The patterns
of former Justice Stewart and Chief Justice Burger are quite similar; the
two split on the results in only two cases, 15 and in one of those Chief
Justice Burger relied on a procedural ground.16 Justice Rehnquist, by
contrast, has shown more divergence from each of his conservative co-
horts. He split with Chief Justice Burger on four occasions, 17 three ex-
plicitly on the merits, 18 and from former Justice Stewart no less than six
times, four of which were on the merits. 19
The significance of these figures becomes more apparent when one
compares Justice Stewart's record with that of each of the swing justices.
He differed from Justice Powell in only three cases-one of which fo-
cused on a procedural issue2°-and from Justices Stevens and Blackmun
on two occasions each.2' Thus, Justice Stewart's voting record would
15. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Stewart, J., joining the majority opinion striking down
statute; Burger, C.J., joining the dissent on a procedural ground); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment striking down statute; Burger, C.J., dissenting).
16. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 290-300 (1979) (Burger, C.J., joining in the dissenting opinion
of Rehnquist, J., which was based on a lack of standing).
17. Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Taylor v. Lousiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Taylor was not an equal protection case per se; instead, it was a sixth amendment challenge to a
Louisiana system which automatically made men eligible for jury service but required women to file
a written declaration of their desire to be chosen. Nonetheless, the Court clearly dealt with the case
as one involving sex discrimination, repeatedly framing the issue in terms of the "systematic exclu-
sion of women," Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531, and rejecting by implication the argument that the criminal
defendant would have to show prejudice ultimately to prevail. See id. at 538 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
18. Rehnquist dissented in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), on procedural grounds. See
id at 18-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have declined to reach the
constitutional issue in view of policy against unnecessary constitutional adjudication).
19. Rehnquist and Stewart disagreed on the merits in Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446
U.S. 142 (1980), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974) (constitutionality of requiring pregnant women to take unpaid maternity leave) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissented from the majority opinion authored by Stewart, J.-which held the mandatory
maternity leave rules unconstitutional because they relied on an irrebuttable presumption of incapac-
ity-on grounds that disapproving irrebuttable presumptions would jeopardize the validity of many
other statutes). See infra note 38 on LaFleur and other cases involving discrimination on the baisis
of pregnancy.
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart differed on procedural issues in Orr v. Off, 440 U.S. 268 (1979),
and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
20. On the merits, Justices Stewart and Powell differed in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). They split on a procedural question in Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1977).
21. The cases in which Justices Stewart and Blackmun split were Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979), and Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1980). The cases in which Justices Stewart
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suggest that he was more closely aligned with the Court "moderates"
than with the extremely conservative Justice Rehnquist.
Further, Justice Stewart's basic mode of analysis differs substantially
from that of Justice Rehnquist in a number of areas of sex discrimination
law. Professor Freedman herself notes these differences in her discussion
of cases involving facial discrimination against men.2 2 Although joining
with Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in most such cases, for-
mer Justice Stewart demonstrated a willingness to apply a standard of
review at least marginally more stringent than the traditional rational
basis test.23 Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, by contrast,
have evinced no such inclination. 24
If Justice Stewart's "defection" in these cases were the only contrary
evidence, one might still plausibly maintain that the three conservatives
pursue the same basic approach to sex discrimination cases. But differ-
ences emerge in other areas as well. One such area is the analysis of the
scope of disparate impact analysis under Title VII. In Dothard v. Rawl-
inson,2 5 all three conservatives agreed that proof that an employment cri-
terion has a disproportionate sexual impact places a burden of
justification on the employer. The concurring opinion of Justice Rehn-
quist and Chief Justice Burger, however, indicates that they believe the
burden should be less onerous than that suggested by former Justice
Stewart's majority opinion.2 6
and Stevens reached different conclusions were Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), and
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
22. Freedman, supra note 1, at 928 & n.72.
23. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (Stewart, J., joining majority opinion) (gender
classifications must be substantially related to important government objectives); see also Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 214-15 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (state's discretion to con-
trol alcoholic beverages does not empower it to act irrationally or to discriminate invidiously). See
generally Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. REv.
357, 383-87 (1982) (describing framework of Stewart's approach to discrimination against males).
24. In Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger did acknowledge that the Court has held that the traditional rational basis test takes on a
"somewhat sharper focus" in cases involving discrimination against men. Id. at 468 (plurality opin-
ion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., et al.). Each, however, has indicated that he would
prefer to use rational basis analysis in such cases. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-18 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id at 215-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Further, Justice Rehnquist has
never voted to strike down as unconstitutional a statute that discriminates against men. Although
Chief Justice Burger did cast such a vote on one occasion, see Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 142 (1980), his vote in that case seems to have been a product of other factors. See
Maltz, supra note 23, at 379-80 (stare decisis the principal factor).
25. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
26. Compare id. at 337-40 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result) with id at 328-31 (Stewart,
J., writing for the majority). Professor Freedman notes the existence of these different opinions
without comment. Freedman, supra note 1, at 928 & n.73.
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In cases involving constitutional challenges to facial discrimination
against women, the differences among the conservatives are even more
striking. A full analysis of the six such cases in which all three of the
conservatives participated suggests that Justice Rehnquist is pursuing an
independent course. Justice Rehnquist did join in an opinion with the
other conservatives in Califano v. Westcott.27 In that case, a unanimous
Court struck down a provision of the Social Security Act that discrimi-
nated against women. Rather than joining the majority opinion in West-
cott, the three conservatives concurred in Justice Powell's separate
opinion, but that concurring opinion did not discuss the standard against
such discriminations were to be measured; instead, after acknowledging
in one sentence that the challenged discrimination was unconstitutional,
the opinion was directed entirely to the issue of the appropriate rem-
edy.28 And in in one case-Kirchberg v. Feenstra29-Justice Rehnquist
joined Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion that found the challenged
discrimination to be unconstitutional. 30 But the five other cases contain
little evidence of a joint approach; instead, there are a number of indica-
tions that Justice Rehnquist is committed to an approach quite different
from that of any other member of the Court. In two of these cases-
Frontiero v. Richardson31 and Taylor v. Louisiana32 -he stood alone in
voting to reject the constitutional challenge, while the other conserva-
tives both voted with majorities that struck down the challenged statutes.
In Stanton v. Stanton,33 Rehnquist was once more alone in dissent; in this
case, however, his dissent was on procedural grounds.34 Finally, while
joining a unanimous Court in voting to strike down the gender-based
discrimination at issue in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,35 Justice Rehnquist
concurred only in the result; his separate opinion argued that the statute
was unconstitutional because the discrimination did "not rationally serve
any valid legislative purpose." 36 By contrast, Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stewart joined in Justice Brennan's majority opinion which fo-
cused on the fact that male and female wage-earners with minor children
were "similarly situated."137
27. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
28. Id. at 93-96. (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
29. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
30. Id. at 463 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); see also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), discussed infra note 38.
31. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
32. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
33. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
34. See supra note 18.
35. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
36. Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result).
37. Id at 653. Burger also joined Justice Powell's concurring opinion. See id. at 654-55.
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In short, in sex discrimination cases, 38 Justice Rehnquist has exhib-
ited a substantial degree of independence from both Chief Justice Burger
and former Justice Stewart. If one is concerned solely with implications
for feminist theory, these differences might well be dismissed as insignifi-
cant. The differences are largely confined to "easy" cases-cases in
which even a large number of those who would not identify themselves as
feminists might find the challenged discrimination to be so arbitrary as to
be objectionable. In virtually all of the "hard" cases-cases in which
some plausible justification exists for the sex classification-the conserva-
tives have voted together. Because it is primarily with the latter group of
cases that feminist theory is concerned, from that perspective the differ-
ences among the conservatives might seem uninteresting or even trivial.
But if one is concerned more specifically with the functioning of the
Court in sex discrimination cases, these differences assume far more im-
portance. They reflect significant differences in the viewpoints of the jus-
tices regarding the judicial role generally--differences that are reflected
not only in sex discrimination cases, but in other areas as well. 39 The
next section will explore the role played by factors that are outside the
scope of-and hence ignored by-feminist theory, but which nonetheless
influence judicial decisionmaking in sex discrimination cases.
38. Although most commentators view discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as a species of
sex discrimination, see Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983-84
(1984), cases such as Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), are better analyzed separately. In
Geduldig, Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's majority opinion applying the rational basis test
to reject a challenge to a California law which excluded expenses resulting from normal pregnancy
from coverage by a disability program. Justice Stewart's analysis, however, was based on the propo-
sition that pregnancy-based classifications do not constitute sex discrimination. See id at 496-97.
Thus, the Geduldig opinion does not necessarily reflect the views of either justice on the question of
what standard of review should be applied generally in cases involving sex discrimination.
In any event, Geduldig cannot be considered in isolation. The Supreme Court has decided a
number of constitutional cases dealing with pregnancy-based discrimination in a variety of forms,
and in two of those cases Justices Rehnquist and Stewart have split. Turner v. Department of Em-
ployment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam opinion; Stewart, J., in the majority; Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (state statute rendering pregnant women ineligible for unemployment compensation for
period extending from twelve weeks before birth to six weeks after birth found to violate the four-
teenth amendment); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (Stewart, J., writing for
the majority; Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (school board rule requiring all pregnant teachers to take
leave without pay five months prior to delivery violated the fourteenth amendment). Thus, even if
one focuses on the issue of pregnancy-based discrimination, the positions of Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist differ significantly.
39. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171-78 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the restrictions on abortion at issue did not violate the fourteenth amendment) with id at 167-71




III. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
The main thrust of the descriptive component of Professor Freed-
man's analysis is established early in her article:
The struggle within the Court over the meaning of sex equality can be
framed in terms of three questions. First, are sex differences and their
social consequences natural (and thus inevitable) or cultural (and
hence subject to change)? Second, if particular sex differences or their
social consequences are cultural in origin, are they desirable or harm-
ful? Third, assuming that they are harmful, are they sufficiently im-
portant to justify major social investment to reduce both the extent and
the consequences of various types of sex differences?4°
At various stages, Professor Freedman does suggest or imply that other
factors may influence the justices' votes and the manner in which they
articulate their respective positions.41 But her basic message is clear:
The primary factor which divides the Court in sex discrimination cases is
the justices' differing views concerning the nature and appropriateness of
sex-role stereotyping.
Certainly such differences play an important role in the divisions of
the Court. Other considerations are, however, also important in the judi-
cial decisionmaking process. Foremost among these are institutional fac-
tors-those concerns that move judges not because of any direct bearing
on the substantive issues at stake in a given case, but rather because of
connections with a general theory about the proper role of the judiciary
in the governing process.
A. Generally Accepted Institutional Factors.
At times, the institutional factors at work in sex discrimination cases
seem so obvious that one takes them for granted. Dothard v. Rawlin-
son 42 provides an example of this phenomenon. Although Professor
Freedman focuses primarily on the issue of the segregation of male and
female prison guards,43 the Court's disposition of the height and weight
requirements in Dothard poses a greater challenge to her method of
analysis.
The justices were unanimous in striking down the use of these physi-
cal requirements. All agreed that the plaintiffs were not required to
40. Freedman, supra note 1, at 917; see also id. at 952 (approach of conservatives largely pre-
mised on "unreflective biological determinism"); id. at 924 (different approaches of justices reflect
opposing views about nature and significance of sexual differences).
41. See id.. at 929 (discussing the personal perspectives which the "swing" justices--Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens-employ in their decisionmaking). See generally id. at 961-64 (ad-
dressing the role of normative considerations in constitutional decisionmaking).
42. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
43. Freedman, supra note 1, at 934-38.
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prove that the height and weight restrictions were adopted with a dis-
criminatory intent. Instead, the Court concluded that the existence of a
disparate impact on women as a class was sufficient to shift the burden of
persuasion to the employer. Admittedly, Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Blackmun and Rehnquist expressed the view that the so-called "ef-
fects" test should have a more limited scope than that suggested by
Stewart's majority opinion. 44 But all of the justices agreed that when a
requirement has the effect of putting women at a disadvantage, a substan-
tial burden of justification is placed upon the employer.
In the later case of Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,45 all of the
justices except Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed that the mere fact
that a facially neutral law had the effect of disproportionately excluding
women from government employment was not sufficient to raise the level
of scrutiny under the equal protection clause. In terms of sex discrimina-
tion theory, Dothard had presented precisely the same issue. Viewed
solely through the prism of Freedman's analysis, seven of the votes on
this issue in Dothard appear totally anomalous. If the two cases are to be
reconciled, other factors must be at work.
The key point, of course, is that the Dothard challenge was based
not on the equal protection clause, but rather on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.46 Thus, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.47 became rele-
vant. In Griggs, the Court had unanimously held that where an employ-
ment practice had a disparate impact on a group protected by Title VII,
then that practice was illegal unless it could be justified by a business
necessity. Once Griggs had been decided, the doctrine of stare decisis
came into play in later Title VII cases such as Dothard.
But the application of the traditional common law doctrine of stare
decisis alone would not have been sufficient to generate the unanimous
vote in Dothard. Griggs was a race discrimination case, and much of the
opinion is devoted to a discussion of race-specific factors; a large part of
the Court's rationale was the assumption that the inability of blacks to
compete effectively on the test at issue there was the result of widespread
discrimination in the past.48 By contrast, height and weight differences
between the sexes are largely independent of social conditions. Thus if
Dothard had been a common law case, Griggs could have been easily
distinguished.
44. Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 337-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the result) with id. at 328-31 (majority opinion).
45. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
47. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
48. See id. at 430-31.
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What made Griggs a compelling precedent in Dothard was a second
institutional convention-one of statutory interpretation. The same sen-
tence in Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of either race or
sex. 49 Given this juxtaposition, the linguistic conventions of statutory
interpretation require that the standards for establishing "discrimina-
tion" on the basis of sex be the same as the standards for establishing
"discrimination" on the basis of race. Thus, once the effects test had
been adopted in Griggs, the Court was constrained to adopt the same
standard in Dothard.
In Dothard, institutional factors influenced justices to vote to strike
down the challenged requirement. In other contexts, however, these fac-
tors can have precisely the opposite impact. Feeney 50 provides an exam-
ple of this phenomenon. Considering only the facts, Dothard would have
been a highly relevant precedent. As already noted, Feeney, like
Dothard, involved the employment practices of a state agency, and the
challenged criterion in both cases had a disparate, negative impact on
women. In rejecting the challenge in Feeney, however, the Court did not
mention Dothard; instead, the majority relied51 on Washington v. Da-
vis,52 a case that involved racial discrimination rataer than sex-based dis-
crimination. Once again, the key factor was the difference between
constitutional and statutory analysis. Like Davis, but unlike Dothard,
the Feeney challenge was based on the Constitution rather than an an-
tidiscrimination statute. The conventions of the doctrine of stare decisis
indicate that while distinctions between facts are often important, a dif-
ference in the legal bases of the complaints is always critical. The Feeney
Court's decision to rely on Davis rather than Dothard is thus entirely
consistent with legal convention.
The Dothard and Feeney examples illustrate the impact on sex dis-
crimination law of institutional conventions that are universally
respected. Even where such conventions are controversial, however,
they may affect the approach of individual justices to such cases. The
next subsection will examine the effect of institutional concerns on the
sex discrimination jurisprudence of three justices-Justice Rehnquist
from the "Right," Justice Stevens from the "Center," and Justice White
from the "Left."
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
50. 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
51. Id. at 273-74, 275, 277.
52. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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B. Idiosyncratic Institutional Concerns.
1. Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist is the leading apostle of
judicial restraint on the Burger Court. In the context of equal protection
law, his approach is predicated on two basic tenets. First, he has an
extremely narrow conception of the rational basis test. As his opinion in
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 53 demonstrates, he does not require
classifications in general to satisfy an articulated governmental purpose.
Instead, he asks only if there might be a "plausible reason" for the legis-
lative decision. In his opinion, once such a plausible reason is discovered,
"our inquiry is at an end."'54 The result is that he has voted to defer to
presumed legislative judgment in virtually all rational basis cases. 55
The second major component of Justice Rehnquist's approach to
equal protection issues is his view that there should be virtually no excep-
tions to rational basis analysis. Arguing from a traditional interpretivist
position, he would limit the exercise of elevated scrutiny to discrimina-
tions based on race or national origin. While he has not explicitly made
this argument in any sex discrimination case, he has forcefully espoused
this approach in cases involving classifications based on alienage56 and
illegitimacy.5 7 It is in the context of these two factors that Justice Rehn-
quist's discussions of the "reality" of sex differences must be considered.
Since sex is not race or national origin, in his view the rational basis test
applies. And for the purposes of his rational basis analysis, he is con-
cerned with the "reality" of differences only in a very special sense. The
question is not whether differences are created by physical or social cir-
cumstance, but instead whether any difference between two groups exists
and whether that difference might plausibly be viewed as related to some
governmental purpose which would justify the challenged
classification.5 8
Even the most egregious discriminations based on sex satisfy this
53. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
54. Id. at 179.
55. One clear exception is Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 443-44 (1982) (Pow-
ell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result) (denial of the right to a hearing because of
failure of state to provide a hearing on the claim within 120 days, created a classification not ration-
ally related to a legitimate state interest); see also Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (disputed provision of Social Security Act did not rationally serve a valid
governmental purpose).
56. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649-64 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf. Freedman,
supra note 1, at 928 n.70 (observing that Justice Rehnquist apparently believes the minimum ration-
ality standard applies to gender classifications).
58. See, eg., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 661-64 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
also Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 106, 183-84 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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standard. For example, in Reed v. Reed 59 the Court was faced with an
Idaho statute which provided that with regard to the selection of persons
to administer an intestate estate, "[o]f several persons claiming and
equally entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females."' 60
With Justice Rehnquist not participating, the Court had no trouble in
unanimously finding this discrimination unconstitutional. Yet in Ameri-
can society, males are more likely than females to possess business exper-
tise, and such expertise is plausibly related to skill in estate
administration. Thus, under a pure Rehnquistian rational basis analysis,
the Idaho statute might well have been found constitutional.
Against this background, it is not surprising that Rehnquist has
been generally unsympathetic to constitutional attacks on laws that dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. Indeed, what is somewhat surprising is
that he has voted to invalidate sex-based classifications in cases such as
Weinberger, Westcott, and Feenstra.61 The latter votes can probably be
explained as tactical responses to the problem of obtaining practical re-
sults on a multimember Court. The voting pattern in Frontiero and Tay-
lor demonstrated clearly that Rehnquist was completely alone in his
belief that the rational basis test should be applied to laws that on their
faces discriminate against women.62 Thus, only by joining a coalition of
justices with less extreme views than his own could Justice Rehnquist
hope to have a practical impact on the shape of the developing law in this
area. Justice Rehnquist's approaches in Weinberger and Feenstra can be
seen as attempts to provide a framework within which such a coalition
could be built.
In short, Justice Rehnquist's theories of the constitutional status of
laws that discriminate on the basis of gender can be explained in terms of
institutional factors that transcend his substantive views on the issue of
sex discrimination per se. He does not claim that legislatures are gener-
ally correct in choosing to discriminate on the basis of sex; he would
simply argue that the decisions are not wholly irrational and thus that he
is bound to respect them. It might be suggested that Justice Rehnquist's
decision to adopt this mode of analysis in sex discrimination cases is
nothing more than a device to disguise his views on the specific substan-
tive issues at stake. In evaluating this claim, however, two factors must
be kept in mind. First, historically the theory of judicial restraint has not
had a one-to-one correspondence with political conservatism. Felix
Frankfurter, for example, was a leading civil libertarian in the early
59. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
60. Id. at 73.
61. See supra notes 27-30 & 35-36 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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twentieth century. Yet after being appointed to the Supreme Court, he
was one of the least "activist" of the justices on the early Warren Court.
Second, and equally important, is the evidence of Justice Rehnquist's
overall voting record. If his advocacy of judicial restraint were simply a
device to advance conservative substantive positions, then he would tend
to espouse a different institutional philosophy in cases where judicial ac-
tivism would advance conservative causes. Yet, while it is possible to
find some evidence of this phenomenon, 63 no consistent pattern emerges.
Justice Rehnquist has, for example, voted to reject constitutional chal-
lenges to state laws requiring private property owners to give access to
those seeking to advance political causes" and limiting the influence of
corporations in the political process. 65 Given his conservative political
views, these votes would be rather surprising if only specific substantive
elements were considered. Thus the only plausible explanation is that
Rehnquist was moved by general institutional concerns in these cases.
Of course, to suggest that Justice Rehnquist's advocacy of judicial
restraint is unrelated to his political conservatism would be extremely
naive. Moreover, as already noted, there are examples of cases where
other factors have moved Justice Rehnquist to abandon his generally def-
erential posture. But the point is that Justice Rehnquist's voting pattern
is not solely a product of his attitude toward sex discrimination; the pat-
tern also reflects his more general view of the appropriate role of the
Supreme Court in American society.
2. Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Califor-
nia v. Goldfarb 66 is the key to understanding his approach to the consti-
tutional law of sex discrimination. Goldfarb was a challenge to a
provision of the federal Social Security program which automatically
paid survivor's benefits to the widow of a deceased insured but paid such
benefits to a widower only if he had been actually dependent on his de-
ceased wife. Analyzing the relevant discrimination as being against men
63. See, e-g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (hold-
ing that applications of the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to all employ-
ees of states did not comport with the federal system of government and was not within Congress'
commerce power); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290-94 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (arguing that Congress, in preferring the major political parties in election legisla-
tion, impermissibly discriminated against minor parties and independents).
64. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., writing for the
majority).
65. See, eg., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 551 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., joining Blackmun, J., dissenting) (economic restrictions on political advertising by
utilities found to be constitutional); First Nat. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 827 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (adopting a restrictive view of the political liberties of business corporations).
66. 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the result).
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rather than against women, 67 Stevens nonetheless concluded that the
provision was unconstitutional. His analysis began by noting that the
discrimination did not "add to the burdens of an already disadvantaged
discrete minority."68 In addition, he noted two "hypothetical justifica-
tions" that, if proven to be the actual impetus for the statute, might jus-
tify the discrimination. Upon a close analysis of these possibilities,
however, he concluded that neither had provided the actual justification
for the statutory distinction.69 Instead, he argued, the discrimination
was "merely the accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking
about females." 70 Reasoning that "a rule which effects an unequal distri-
bution of economic benefits solely on the basis of sex is sufficiently ques-
tionable that 'due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for
presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve [the] interest' put
forward by the Government as its justification, ' 71 Stevens concluded that
the challenged discrimination was invalidated by the fifth amendment. 72
Justice Stevens further clarified his approach in Michael M. v. Supe-
rior Court.73 Considering the constitutionality of a law which punished
men but not women for statutory rape, Justice Stevens divided laws that
discriminate against men into two classes. Where the physical differ-
ences between the sexes are "obviously irrelevant," he would view the
classification as presumptively invalid. By contrast, where there is an
"apparent connection" between inherent physical differences and the
challenged classifications, then the classification would be presumed
valid. 74 This presumption could be overcome, however, by a showing
that the apparent justification was "illusory or wholly inadequate. ' 75
Finding that the justification in Michael M, was "illusory," Justice Ste-
vens dissented from the holding that the classification was constitution-
ally unobjectionable. 76
Taken together, the Goldfarb and Michael M. opinions reflect a
complex interaction between substantive and institutional elements. The
choice to subject discrimination against males to a test more stringent
than traditional rational basis analysis is based on a substantive judgment
that, as a general matter of political morality, such discrimination re-
67. Id at 218.
68. Id..
69. Id..
70. Id. at 223.
71. Id. (quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wang, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976)).
72. Id. at 116-17.
73. 450 U.S. 464, 496 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 497 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 499-500.
[Vol. 1985:177
SEX EQUALITY AND THE COURT
quires special justification. On the other hand, Justice Stevens' apparent
application of a test for discrimination against males which is less strict
than that for discrimination against females implies a rejection of the
standard feminist argument that almost all sex discrimination ultimately
redounds to the disadvantage of women.77 Finally, again on a substan-
tive level, Justice Stevens' distinction between those classifications based
on physical differences and those that are based on socially created dis-
tinctions might be viewed as a rejection of the feminist position on the
nature of "real" sex differences. 78
But Justice Stevens' approach clearly reflects institutional concerns
as well. The basic theme of the Goldfarb and Michael M, analyses is not
that the Supreme Court should displace the judgment of the legislature in
sex discrimination matters whenever the Court finds that judgment to be
unsound. Instead, Justice Stevens considers the judicial role to be pro-
cess-oriented. Where he views the legislature as having based its discrim-
ination against men on a good faith analysis of appropriate
considerations, Justice Stevens will allow the discrimination to stand.79
In contrast, when he perceives the legislative decision to have been based
on pure prejudice or stereotypical generalizations, he will vote to strike
down that decision, as he did in Goldfarb and Michael M, Justice Ste-
vens' distinction between sex classifications based on physical character-
istics and those which are not is entirely consistent with this conception
of the judicial role. Where a classification is related to physical differ-
ences between the sexes, a plausible reason for legislative action is imme-
diately apparent and the likelihood that the action is based on pure
prejudice is significantly reduced. Conversely, where no such physical
difference can be pointed to as a justification for a classification, the sus-
picion of prejudice is greater. Thus, the analysis in Michael M. can be
viewed as reflecting the basic institutional thrust of Justice Stevens'
approach.
Of course, absent other evidence, it might be argued that Justice
Stevens simply seized on these institutional concepts as convenient sup-
port for his views on the specific substantive issue of sex discrimination.
A similar institutional orientation, however, appears in a wide range of
contexts throughout Justice Stevens' equal protection jurisprudence. In-
deed, he first expressed these institutional views not in a sex discrimina-
tion case, but rather in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong 80-a case involving a
77. See, ag., Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. RFv. 955, 987-1002
(1984).
78. See, eg., Freedman, supra note 1, at 944-47.
79. See, e-g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 401 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Stevens, J., writing for the majority).
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civil service regulation that discriminated on the basis of alienage. Jus-
tice Stevens has used essentially the same approach in cases involving
discrimination against whites,81 discrimination among various Indian
tribes,8 2 and the problem of evaluating electoral systems which have the
effect of diluting the voting power of blacks.8 3 In short, it is not possible
to describe accurately Justice Stevens' approach to sex-based discrimina-
tion solely in specific substantive terms; as in the case of Justice Rehn-
quist, one must also recognize his important commitment to certain
general institutional values.
3. Justice White. Viewed solely from the perspective of the strug-
gle for sex equality, Justice White's voting pattern appears almost schizo-
phrenic. On one hand, he has joined consistently with the most activist
members of the Court-Justices Brennan and Marshall-in cases involv-
ing constitutional challenges to facial discrimination.8 4 Taken alone, this
pattern would seem to indicate that Justice White is generally in sympa-
thy with those who believe that the Court should take a strong stand and
move vigorously to eradicate sex discrimination in American society. On
the other hand, he has voted against attempts to subject classifications to
stringent constitutional scrutiny solely because those classifications have
a disparate negative impact on women.85 Under Professor Freedman's
analysis, these votes would suggest that Justice White is something less
than fully committed to the cause of sexual equality.
In large measure, this seeming anomaly can be explained by refer-
ence to institutional factors. The best evidence of Justice White's con-
cern with such factors is his opinion in Washington v. Davis. 6 Davis
involved a challenge to the use of a standardized test as a criterion for
employment as a police officer. The essence of the complaint was that
the test excluded a disproportionately high number of blacks from the
police force. In general, Justice White has been relatively sympathetic to
the claims of minority races;8 7 nonetheless, he wrote the majority opin-
81. Fullilove v. Klutzaick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 91 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 631 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the result).
84. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
85. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (failure to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged law reflects a purpose to discriminate on the basis of sex); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 347 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (no prima facie case of sex discrimination merely be-
cause statistics show that height and weight requirements would exclude a larger percentage of
women).
86. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
87. See, eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (White, J., writing for the majority) (expan-
sive view of the scope of fourteenth and fifteenth amendment restrictions on representation schemes
that dilute minority voting strength); Columbia Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (White,
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ion in Davis, explaining why the Court rejected the constitutional chal-
lenge. He reasoned that:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or bur-
dens one race more than another would be far reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may
be more burdensome to the poor and the average black than to the
more affluent white.
Given that rule, such consequences would perhaps be likely to
follow. However, in our view, extension of the rule beyond those areas
where it is already applicable by reason of statute. . . should await
legislative prescription.88
The import of this analysis is clear. While Justice White might be-
lieve that, in general, race and sex discrimination are social evils that
should be eradicated, he views large-scale alterations in the basic struc-
ture of society as a legislative prerogative. The same considerations no
doubt led him to follow Davis in Feeney 89; certainly, active judicial inter-
vention against all institutional arrangements that had a disproportionate
sexual impact would be no less disruptive than analogous judicial action
to ameliorate effects on minority races.
To summarize, like Justices Stevens and Rehnquist, Justice White
seems to be influenced by both specific substantive factors and institu-
tional concerns. His voting pattern in cases involving facial discrimina-
tion reflects a general distaste for sex discrimination and its
consequences. On the other hand, he is unwilling to commit the judici-
ary to a major restructuring of society, viewing that task as the role of the
legislature.
C. Summary.
The development of sex discrimination law in the Supreme Court
clearly has been influenced by institutional as well as specific substantive
factors. Of course, this observation does not imply that specific substan-
tive factors have not had a strong effect on the respective voting patterns
of the justices; the various justices' views on the nature and significance
of sex discrimination and on the role of government as a whole in dealing
with the problem have had a profound impact on the development of the
jurisprudence in this area. Moreover, the nature of the interaction be-
tween institutional and specific substantive factors varies greatly from
J., writing for the majority) (expansive view of the federal courts' remedial powers in school desegre-
gation cases).
88. 426 U.S. at 248 (footnote omitted).
89. See supra notes 45 & 51-52 and accompanying text.
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justice to justice. In the case of Justice Rehnquist, for example, the sub-
stantive and institutional factors seem to reinforce one another; for Jus-
tice White, by contrast, institutional concerns act to restrain his
willingness to implement his specific substantive judgments. But the cru-
cial point remains the same-one cannot accurately describe the develop-
ment of sex discrimination law without reference to the role of
institutional factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
One can argue, of course, that institutional considerations should
not play a large role in sex discrimination litigation generally. A system
in which the justices generally ignored both precedents and legislative
judgments and simply voted on the basis of their independent analyses of
specific substantive elements might seem strange; nonetheless one can-
at least in theory-conceive of such a system. But if a commentator at-
tempts to describe the actual decisionmaking dynamic of the contempo-
rary Court, her analysis must reflect the important influence of
institutional concerns on the justices' decisionmaking process.
The difficulty with feminist jurisprudence-and normative ap-
proaches generally-is that they are simply not constructed with a view
to appreciating and analyzing institutional considerations. This is not to
suggest that normative analysis is without value. As Professor Freedman
has amply demonstrated, the use of a normative approach can generate
important insights into the relationship between judicial decisions and
the larger issues facing society. But only by combining normative tech-
niques with a more traditional approach can one paint a truly accurate
picture of the process of constitutional decisionmaking.
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